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W.: Contracts--Acceptance by Telephone--Place of Contract

CASE COMMENTS
recover $300 of this amount from the true owner of the property under the ad valorem tax, for an adjusted total of $900. It would seem
that, because Murray is unfortunate enough to be using government
property, he must pay $300 more tax then if he had been using the
property of some private individual. Could the state also impose on
Murray a tax like that in City of Detroit or Township of Muskegon,
that is, a tax "for the privilege of using exempt property"? Or would
it be limited to either the tax collected under the ad valorem statute
or the tax collected under the privilege of using exempt property
statute?
It is believed that the holding of the principal case will have
more far reaching implications then was contemplated. Is it not now
possible for any state in the union to simply impose the traditional
ad valorem tax on private parties using government property and indirectly collect the same amount as though the tax were levied "on"
the government property, even though the same private parties are
not subjected to any form of a privilege tax? It is submitted, if the
result in this case is the desirable one, that such result should be
formulated into policy by Congress so that the positions, in this
area, of the federal government, the states, and the private party
doing business with the federal government will have some degree of
certainty.
J.L.R.

CoNTRAcrs-AcCaTANcEc BY TELEPHONE-PLACE OF CoNTRAcr.An action of account was brought by the offeror in a contract for
the reinsurance of certain risks. The outcome is dependent on the
enforceability of the contract, and due to differences in the statute of
frauds in Pennsylvania and New York (the New York statute contains the provision making contracts not to be performed within one
year unenforceable unless in writing; the Pennsylvania statute omits
this provision), the enforceability is in tuna dependent on the place
of the contract P, with offices in Philadelphia, traveled to New York
to communicate an offer to D. P returned to Philadelphia, where
he was contacted by telephone by D accepting the offer. Held, reversing the lower court, that acceptance by telephone of an offer
takes place where the words are spoken. Linn v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 189 A.2d 688 (Pa. 1958).
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That a controversy does exist among legal writers with regard to
the place of contract when acceptance is by telephone is readily
discernible from the following sources:
RFSrATmvm T (SEcoND), CoNrmcr oF LAws § 826 (1958),
states "if the acceptance is sent by any other means, (other than by
an agent) the place of contracting is the state from which the acceptance is sent." Comment c of the same Restatement is headed acceptance by telephone, and pinpoints the above quotation to the fact
situation in question: "When an acceptance is to be given by telephone, the place of contracting is where the acceptor speaks his acceptance."
RESTATEmNT, CoNTacrs § 65 (1932) states that "acceptance
given by telephone is governed by the principles applicable to oral
acceptances where the parties are in the presence of each other."
There are no comments or examples under this section. When this
Restatement is read in the light of WmmasToN, CoNTcrAcs § 82 (rev.
ed. 1938), it becomes clear that the Restatement favors the view that
the contract would take place where heard. Professor Williston
takes the position that a "contract by telephone presents quite as
great an analogy to a contract made where the parties are in each
other's presence." He applies this theory by continuing: "It has
not been suggested in the latter case that the offeror takes the risk
of hearing an acceptance addressed to him. If then it is essential
that the offeror shall hear what is said to him... the time and place
of the formation is not when and where the offeree speaks, but when
and where the offeror hears .... "

The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws view is followed in 1
CoR~n, CoNRmAcrs § 79 (1950), Professor Corbin being unable to
find a single case in support of the Restatement of Contracts.
The view of the Restatement of Contracts and Professor Williston is un;upported by case law as of this writing, and the list of
jurisdictions deciding the question is rapidly growing in length. Inevitably the decisions have favored the view that the contract is
made at the speaker's location. United States v. Bushwick Mills, 165
F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1947); Joseph v. Krull Wholesale Drug Co., 147 F.
Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1956); Cousins v. Harrison,249 Ala. 153, 39 So.
2d 396 (1947); Ward Mfg. Co. v. Miley, 181 Cal. App. 2d 603, 281
P.2d 348 (1955); Pearson v. Electric Service Co., 116 Kan. 300, 201
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P.2d 643 (1949); Traders Oil Mill Co. v. Arnold Bros. Gin Co., 225
S.W.2d 1011 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
Many of these decisions have admitted the view of Professor
Williston to be sound theoretically. It would seem that a telephoned
acceptance is a closer relative of the oral addressing acceptance than
it is of the letter or telegram. However the courts have seemed to
feel that uniformity for acceptances by telephone, telegraph, and
mail is highly desirable, and outweighs the theoretical argument
Although there is no case directly in point in West Virginia,
opinions of the court in telegram and mail cases contain dicta that
indicate strongly that West Virginia would follow the majority view,
and this presumption is strengthened by the cases involving acceptance by telephone.
In Deegans Coal Co. v. Hedrick, 91 W. Va. 877, 113 S.E. 262
(1922), the court, with reference to a contract accepted by telephone, stated that "it could have been and doubtless was accepted
over the telephone and became binding on Deegan the moment of
acceptance." It may be stretching the opinion to areas not anticipated by the court, but it seems of some importance that the court
said "moment of acceptance", not moment when acceptance was
heard, thus indicating that the place of the contract would be the acceptor's end of the telephone line.
The above opinion stretching may seem more justified when
Galloway v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 45 W. Va. 237, 31 S.E. 969
(1898), is read. This case concerned an acceptance by mail, and the
court held (without seeming to limit its words to mail cases), that
"the place of acceptance, not delivery, decides where the contract is
made, as a general rule." And in Three States Coal. Co. v. Superior
Elkhorn By-Products Coal Co., 110 W. Va. 455, 158 S.E. 661 (1931),
the court seemed to give support to the majority: "Generally a contract is considered as formed at the place where the offer is accepted,
or where the last act necessary to complete it is formed."
Additional grounds for the belief that West Virginia would follow the majority view are contained in State v. Davis, 62 W. Va. 500,
60 S.E. 584 (1907). D, who was engaged in selling alcoholic beverages, received a telephone call from A placing an order, A stating
that she would pay when delivery was made. In this case the court
was attempting to pinpoint the place of the actual sale, not only the
executory contract of sale. A made the offer, acceptance was by D,
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and the court held the place of the executed sales contract was where
the acceptance was spoken.
Aside from these indications there is the persuasive argument of
the desirability of uniformity in contract law. The great majority of
states have adopted the view that telephone acceptances should be
governed by the same rules as telegrams and letters, and it is submitted that the West Virginia courts would feel as did the court in
the principal case, which stated:
"We believe that in this day of multistate commercial transactions it is particularly desirable that the determination of the
place of contracting be the same regardless of the state in which
suit takes place. The absence of uniformity makes the rights and
liabilities of parties to a contract dependent upon the choice of
the state in which suit is instituted and thus encourages forumshopping."
T. J. W.

CmxImrwIAL LAw-DEcEP=IVE ADvETisiNc--PRnis

INx MODEL

STAT=rrE.-The New York Penal Law § 421 prohibits untrue, deceptive or misleading advertising. Defendant placed several signs in his
store windows advertising the he was selling toys at a twenty per
cent to forty per cent discount. It was established from the evidence
that his prices were the same as or in excess of the prevailing prices
in the community. Held, affirming defendant's conviction, a retailer cannot establish his own prices at levels higher than the
prices customarily charged in the community and then mark his
prices down to a point equal to or in excess of the standard prices,
thereby creating the impression through advertising that the merchandise could be purchased at his store for less than it could be
purchased elsewhere. People v. Minijac Corp., 175 N.Y.S.2d 16, 151
N.E.2d 180 (1958).
In recent years advertising has become the dominant influence
in guiding the choices of the American public. The reliance of the
public on the truth thereof has given advertisers an instrumentality
for abuse, of which they have taken undue advantage. Established
remedies of deceit, breach of warranty, rescission, and unfair competition cannot be extended to cope with offenses which they were
never intended to cover. See Handler, False and Misleading Advertising, 39 YALE L.J. 22 (1929).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol61/iss1/10

4

